COMMON Wealth No. 1 of Volume 5

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This document is addressed to all people concerned for social justice. In particular, those involved in the provision of social services will find it a useful resource for understanding the motivation of the Catholic Church for being involved in social service and public policy debate.

At times in this document the language of faith is used, but not, it is hoped, in a way that is alienating to others. It is an exercise in 'public theology', that is, talking about faith in a way that is accessible to intelligent, reasonable and responsible members of a society, despite otherwise crucial differences in their beliefs and practices.(Simons 1995). The purpose is three-fold:

Message from Bishop Patrick Power, Chairman of the Catholic Bishops' Committee for Social Welfare I am very proud of the achievements of the Australian Cahtolic Social Welfare commission over recent years. Its influence on important areas of social policy, its readiness to engage in public debate and its advocacy on behalf of the most disadvantaged people in our society have brought great credibility to the Commission itself and the Catholic Church in this country. New appointments to the Commission (at the end of 1995), a new National director (at the start of 1996) and a new Federal government present new challenges to the commission and new format and a new name: COMMON Wealth. This name reflects the commission's belief that a society's true wealth is measured not just in dollars and cents, but in the degree to which all its members are able to contribute to and participate in the life of the community. July 1992 saw the first edition of Catholic Social Welfare, entitled 'Foundations'. Since then the role of the churches in public conversation has itself been a

Part One: The Principles of Catholic Social Teaching

This section articulates the moral principles that the Catholic Church, through its various agencies, seeks to express in the public sphere. That expression should take the form not just of words and statements, but it also has a very practical form, in the myriad ministries that the Church undertakes in the areas of education, health and welfare.

The Primacy of Human Dignity

What is the nature of the justice which is an integral part of the Gospel? In broad terms it means giving to each person that which is due to them. But it is important to specify more clearly what this means in terms of social structures, for there are many competing notions of justice, and the definition we adopt will affect the actions we take as indidviduals and the public policies we adopt as a community in response to particular situations.

One particularly influential view of justice is what might be termed the secular liberal view of justice which is grounded in the concept of an individual's rights. This view is considered again in Part Three, but here it is relevant to note that the rights-based view of justice is underpinned by a view of human beings as individuals motivated primarily by self-interest and a related contractual view of society. In this view, the only reason societies exist is because individual, rational, self-interested human beings enter into a notional contract with one another because they view social relationships as the best way of furthering their own individual interests. Justice, in this view, is therefore not a moral virtue, but the characteristic of social systems in which human selfishness is regulated in the interests of the social harmony necessary for individuals to pursue happiness. This view of society and of justice has some things in common with the Christian view, but there are some fundamental differences.

A Christian anthropology (view of humanity) sees human beings as both (a) created in the image of a Trinitarian God, that is, a God whose very essence is community and self-giving love (caritas), yet also (b) flawed through sin. Sin in this context means a denial of one's true humanity, which is to be generous and inherently predisposed to living in communities. So how does this anthropology influence the Church's definition of justice? The first thing that must be said is that our understanding of justice is not simply an abstract philosophical formulation, but flows directly from our faith. We believe in a loving God, and that we are called to respond to that God through acts of caritas (love) toward our fellow human beings:

In doing this, we are acting in accordance with our true humanity. But this begs the question asked of Jesus: 'Who is my neighbour?' The story that Christ told in response to that question, the story of the Good Samaritan, illustrates firstly that no-one should be excluded from being our neighbour. Differences in race, religious background, and social status mean nothing and are no grounds for discrimination. Secondly the story illustrates that those in need have a special claim on our personal and social resources. The Church and all people of goodwill have a choice to make about standing with those people who are oppressed in our community.

The Christian view of justice then is that state of affairs that exists when human beings act according to their true nature as generous and social beings. In this view, justice is an expression of love (caritas). This is very different from the secular 'liberal' view of justice as the regulation of humanity's innate selfishness. In the Christian view, individual rights are central, just as they are in the secular liberal view, but with one major difference: the Christian view makes other people's rights the central focus of concern, whereas the secular liberal view of justice is primarily about protecting one's own rights.

Thus the 'law of love' brings to the Christian notion of justice a focus on the particular needs of concrete individuals. The fundamental norm of the Catholic social tradition is that individual men (sic) are necessarily the foundation, cause, and end of all social institutions (Pope John XXIII, 1961, n.219). However this does not mean that the Church promotes individualism as an ethical attitude. Individualism rightly encourages moral responsibility for oneself, but lacks a broader perspective which sees human beings as interdependent and sharing responsibility for one another.

The person who is at the centre of Catholic social teaching is an individual who is sustained by and actively contributes through their daily life to a network of interconnecting personal, social and economic relationships. Consequently, the Catholic social tradition views the wealth produced in a society as the product of the combined efforts of all people and the social system as a whole. It is a common wealth, even though the means of its production are most privately owned. However, private ownership is itself seen as a means to an end - the common good - not an end in itself. On these matters, Pope John Paul II has written that

Our faith in a God who is a community supports this social vision. We, who are created in the image of that God, are created as social beings. We are created for, and find our fulfilment in, community, relationship, mutuality and reciprocity.

Society As the Guardian of Human Dignity: Subsidiarity and Solidarity

Thus the concept of justice in the Catholic social tradition is a combination of theological and philosophical ideas about the social nature of human beings, and practical expressions of the law of love (caritas). This means that obligations to justice go beyond the simple liberal view that justice is about not interfering with people's individual liberty. It includes positive duties to aid those in need, to participate in the maintaining of the public good and to share in efforts to create the kinds of institution which promote genuine mutuality and respect (Hollenbach, 1977).

This is the context within which the Church's traditional advocacy for support for families should be seen.

Families are the primary social grouping in which individuals are lovingly nurtured and supported and learn the virtues and values of self-sacrifice and mutual responsibility that are vital to the development of a truly just and compassionate society. (Cass & Cappo, 1995; ACSWC, 1994).

The various institutions of civil society such as businesses, church communities, local sporting clubs, professional associations, trade unions, social service agencies etc. are essential for enabling individuals and families fulfil their social duty to contribute to the social and economic development of the whole community.

The state should therefore support these various bodies, families, and individuals, in so far as they need support, in order that they can carry out their purpose of enhancing human dignity.

This principle of safeguarding human dignity by ensuring that governments and other agencies do not subsume the proper responsibilities of individuals, families, and civic associations is known as the principle of subsidiarity. [T]he individual, the family and society are prior to the State, and ... the State exists in order to protect their rights and not stifle them. (Pope John Paul II, 1991, n.11)

The principle of subsidiarity also places strict limits on the role of government in society. Some public commentators have attempted to use a version of the principle of the subsidiarity to justify a radical reduction in the role of the state, arguing from an individualistic perspective that people ought to be responsible for themselves, not dependent on others or the government. This is an incorrect application of the principle of subsidiarity, because it is not balanced by the equally important virtue of solidarity.

Recognition of this interdependence invalidates moral judgements such as 'independence is good' and 'dependence is bad'. Our social nature and the law of love dictate that we are individuals with both rights and duties which cannot be ignored without the diminution of our human dignity. The principle of solidarity balances and complements subsidiarity because it states that society's institutions must ensure that individuals and families are able to carry out their legitimate responsibilities.

Preferential Option for the Poor

Consequently, the greater the need of an individual, the greater the obligation on others to find ways to promote and protect that person's human dignity. This is the meaning of the expression 'preferential option for the poor.' Pope Paul VI enunciated this concept thus:

The preferential option for the poor should not be equated with a paternalistic understanding of the term 'charity' which provides welfare handouts to 'the needy' without addressing the root causes of their poverty or their exclusion from society and their inability to participate in and contribute to their community's development. This kind of 'cold charity' might temporarily alleviate hardship but does nothing to help people win back the dignity and respect that is due to them as human persons.

The Role of Government

Furthermore, some social suffering is of such magnitude and its causes so entrenched in economic and political systems that the actions of individuals, families and civic associations is not sufficient to address it. Only the authority and the resources of the state, as the representatives of the whole community can make any impact on such problems. The state becomes, in such instances, the instrument of social solidarity, and its actions do not compromise the principle of subsidiarity.

The idea that the goods and services produced by a society are the product of the whole social system and its myriad relationships implies a role for the state in terms of distributive justice. These goods and services are not the property of any individual or class in an exclusive sense (because of the 'social mortgage' on private property) since everyone is involved, at least indirectly, in their production as members of public society.

Therefore when the state taxes those with sufficient resources in order to redistribute some of the common wealth to those in need, either in the form of income support or in the form of social services, are dispensing charity or welfare, but justice.

However, this statement needs qualification. It does not imply that individuals can choose not to make any effort to contribute to the common good and then claim the right to socialised support. For the right to a sufficient level of income is defined and recognised within the context of solidarity and subsidiarity, namely that we each have a responsibility to do as much as we can to fulfil our own needs as well as the needs of others.

Unfortunately, many people in Australian society are forced into a situation where they have no opportunity of contributing, through paid employment, to the common good. This is a serious violation of their human dignity and a denial of their citizenship. Equally damaging is the fact that many people who contribute to the common good in ways other than paid employment, for example those who choose to care for children at home full time, are not given proper recognition or support.

In both these instances, and others, the state must act to ensure that all legal, political, economic and social systems serve to empower individuals to fulfil their duties and exercise their rights to contribute to and participate in the common good, in accordance with the principle of distributive justice. The range of activities that the state must assume to this end, since only the state is able to exercise some overall co-ordinating influence on all the various sectors of society, is the realm of social justice. The institutional and political dimensions of the obligation on all members of society to promote the common good, by creating the mechanisms that deliver distributive justice, is rightly the sphere of government action.

Justice and Love Together

However, the action of government to promote social justice is not sufficient to create a society characterised by solidarity. In the same way that caritas, or charity, can be distorted into a pious pity for others that doesnothing to change alienating social structures by failing to address the root causes of poverty and disadvantage (ACSWC, 1993a), so justice without love becomes a depersonalising imposition of state power, or worse. If, beyond legal rules, these is really no deeper feeling of respect for and service to others, then even equality before the law can serve as an alibi for flagrant discrimination, continued exploitation and actual contempt. (Pope Paul VI, 1971, n.23)

What is required then, is a change of heart, a cultural conversion away from the self-centredness that is underpins so much modern economic and public policy, towards other-centredness. The problem of social injustice is as much a moral problem as a political one.

In summary, then, the principles used by the Church to test public policy, which it seeks to bring to the public conversation about moral values, and which it seeks to apply in its provision of social services to the disadvantaged, devalued and distressed in our community, are:

• The social nature of human beings, created in the image of a loving God;
• the Gospel imperative to love thy neighbour, especially those in need;
• the end of all social arrangements is to enhance the human dignity of individuals;
• each person has rights to share in and duties to contribute to the common good;
• each person must have the necessary resources to fulfil their social responsibilities;
• the state must act, within the limits of the principle of subsidiary, to ensure that all people have these resources ie. adequate food, clothing, shelter, education; and
• justice must be enacted in a spirit of love to create a society marked by genuine solidarity.

Part Two: Three Models of Welfare

The principles articulated above should act as a compass for Catholic social service agencies, to ensure that their practices are correct and that they are heading in the right direction, not being pushed off- course, as it were, by the buffeting winds of financial pressure or the cross-currents of intellectual and theoretical trends. This is not to say that Catholic agencies can ignore the changed political and financial environment within which they are operating, but it does mean that we must 'trim our sails' to ensure that we are still acting in accordance with Gospel imperatives.

What practical difference should the application of these principles make to the way the Church provides social services? This question has special significance at the current time because the community sector has recently come under close scrutiny from the Industry Commission Inquiry into Charitable Organisations. That Inquiry should be seen in the context of a larger process whereby governments at the federal, state, and local level are re-evaluating their own role in welfare, and increasingly looking to the community sector to become involved in delivering government-funded services. This means that new opportunities are opening up for the non-government sector, but new dangers as well.

The first question we need to ask is: 'Who does the Church, through its social service agencies, serve?' In addressing this question is not to identify a particular group of people in society, since Church services are used by myriad groups for a variety of reasons. The point of the question is to challenge us to reflect on how Church social service providers, think about, or conceptualise, the people whom we serve. The way we think affects our practice. Do we think of our constituents primarily as (a) needy, (b) consumers or customers, or (c) fellow-citizens. The answer to this question has important ramifications for how the Church social service agencies conceptualise our own role.

The 'Pity Model': Helping the Deserving Poor

Clearly there is a strong Gospel imperative, reinforced in Catholic Social Teaching, that the needs of particular individuals, especially those who are poor and suffer social disadvantage, must be given the highest priority in the work of Catholic social service agencies. For many centuries, charitable works have been conducted by Christian philanthropic institutions, with funds provided by those with less pressing needs, moved by genuine concern for those less fortunate than themselves. Their financial contributions and voluntary assistance have expressed a form of compassion that is important and valuable.

However, the major problem with this model is that the feeling of vague compassion that motivates it is often shallow distress of the misfortunes of so many and not the firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good that is the hallmark of genuine solidarity and caritas.

The traditional understanding of the term caritas as genuine self-sacrificing love, has unfortunately been undermined by the fact the the English translation, 'charity' is often associated with this condescending and paternalistic approach to welfare. Therefore, in some attempt to recover the power of caritas, that is true charity, this model is referred to here more accurately as the pity model of welfare. Many of our social service agencies which operate out of the pity model rely on the perpetuation of poverty and disadvantages to justify their own existence, since they aim only to alleviate the consequences of disadvantage rather than also eradicate its causes. Perhaps this is simply the pragmatic approach, but pragmatism must be combined with vision if it is not to lapse into an anaemic acceptance bordering on endorsement of the status quo (ACSWC, 1993a). The pity model goes unchallenged as long as donors and workers feel that their contributions represent an optional expression of their own generosity rather a obligation of solidarity and distributive justice. The pity model is thus paternalistic and condescending, and can violate the principle of subsidiarity if it does not seek to empower individuals and families to participate in society as is their right and duty as citizens. Since the pity model is as much about making donors and workers feel righteous as it is about the disadvantaged being helped, it is not surprising that it avoids the difficult and complicated issue of what causes disadvantage.

The Market Model: Empowering the Consumer

In recent years a new paradigm or model of welfare has developed which has become highly influential precisely because it appears to take seriously both the individual and his/her membership of a community. This model, based on market principles, differs significantly from the pity model in a number of ways.

Firstly, it recognises that certain people in society face particular kinds of barriers to full participation in the life of the community, and therefore must have access to services that enable them to overcome these barriers.

Secondly, it recognises that the provision of these services is not an option, but a responsibility of the whole community. Therefore the state must ensure that these services are provided by someone, though not necessarily the public sector itself.

Thirdly, and most significantly, the person being served is not seen in this model as a 'disadvantaged' object of pity, but as a customer or a 'consumer' of a product that is produced by the social service agency. Welfare services, whether they are run by the public sector, the private for-profit sector, or the community sector, should be 'customer driven', and 'client focussed'. This model aims to transfer power from the 'service-provider' to the 'service user', and thus empower that person.

This model is a radical change from the old pity model, and much of it is to be encouraged. However, there are some potential dangers (ACSWC, 1993b). The market model focuses on providing a service as efficiently as possible to an individual consumer. The language of 'consumer' has a seductive effect. It is true that over the past decade,

There are dangers in blithely accepting this new language being pushed on Australia's human service sector. In its lexicon, there are few words or ideas that are useful for analysing the social causes of their disadvantage, and therefore little consideration given to social solutions. This undermines the development of communal identity and solidarity, and the potential for strong political activism aimed at changing policy and institutions.

In bringing about such a massive change in the culture of welfare, governments - both Commonwealth and State/Territory - are assuming a key role. The relationship between government and the community sector is currently undergoing substantial reconfiguration as a consequence.

For many years the state has not only provided many social services through the public sector, but has also contributed funds to community agencies. Accountability for public monies was achieved by informing the appropriate funding department about just how the money was spent. There was little focus on what concrete outcomes were achieved for people in need at the end of the day. Similar problems of lack of 'client-focus' were seen in the public sector services, which were judged to be overly bureaucratic and inflexible.

There is now a belief amongst government policy makers that best way to ensure that social services are responsive to the needs of their 'consumers' is to transform the community sector into a kind of market for social service products, in which a host of social service agencies 'compete' to 'sell' their product to the consumer. People can shop around for the service that suits them best, and agencies that do not adapt to this new market discipline will lose 'clients'.

How will this provide the incentive to become more customer-focussed? This will occur by changing the way agencies are funded. Instead of block grants at the start of the year to assist agencies purchase the various inputs that go into providing a service, agencies will increasingly be funded according to their outputs. So, if a community social service agency cannot 'attract' people in the door to use their services, and do not achieve concrete outcomes for those'clients', their funding will diminish. Thus there is a financial incentive to be as responsive as possible to the needs of the people we serve.

According to the theory, not only are there advantages for the client in this market model of welfare, there are financial advantages for the government, since competition drives down the 'price' it has to pay to the community agencies it funds for each particular unit of output (ACSWC, 1994a).

However, there are several problems with the market model that represent serious dangers for Catholic social service agencies in terms of their ability to continue to operate according to the principles of Catholic social teaching.

For a start, markets only work well when consumers have both full knowledge of all the products on the market and freedom of movement that enables the consumer to exercise the option of changing from one service-provider to another. Often the people who come to community agencies have neither of these initial requirements. Thus the market model assumes away any genuine social disadvantages.

Secondly, the market model's use of the language of consumer choice and flexibility is often illusory. This is because when government departments come to fund a particular kind of service, their primary concern is keeping the cost low. Therefore they will increasingly use the mechanism of calling for tenders from community agencies, to see which agency can provide a particular service for the least amount of money. The service-provider who wins the contract then becomes a virtual monopoly provider of that services to 'consumers'. However, the only consumer with any choice is the government department that is purchasing certain units of output from the lowest cost provider.

A further dilemma arises since the contracted service being paid for by the government is also often designed by its own bureaucrats, sometimes to meet a political agenda rather than a social imperative. This allows little opportunity for feedback from the people who use the service.

These dynamics mean that the market model can end up turning community agencies into little more than agents of government policy, providing services designed by state, not tailored to the needs of individual people in need. This is a far cry from market model's rhetoric about flexibility and consumer choice and empowerment.

The other major deficiency of the market model is that apart from acknowledging the responsibility of the state to fund proper services for particular individuals, the is no real understanding of solidarity. The interaction between the service-provider and the service-user is seen as analogous to the relationship between a shopper and a check-out attendant in a super-market (Paterson, 1995). They are involved in a transaction, but little else. In the contracts signed between government funders and community providers, there is usually little or no recognition given to the agency's role as a representative or an advocate on behalf of those it serves in larger public debates about policy.

In the face of such challenges to the mode of operation of many community agencies, how do we preserve in practice the values and principles we stand for?

The Citizenship Model: Promoting Social Participation

Clearly there are elements of both the pity model and the market model that should characterise a modern Catholic social service organisation. The services we provide should aim to meet the concrete needs of individuals. Our services should not only be compassionate, but flexible enough to take account of individual differences. There must be a special concern for those who are marginalised by mainstream society. We should deliver our services a efficiently as possible without compromising service quality, and we should be properly accountable for the public monies that we use.

However, the principles of Catholic social teaching call on us to do more than this. What is that 'more'? To understand that we need to have a clear vision of what our tradition tells us about those whom we serve and about the important role our organisations have in the social structure.

Firstly, we should see those with whom we work not as victims nor as consumers, but as fellow- citizens, who have rights and responsibilities. Secondly, we should see our social service organisations as strengthening the democratic quality of society, not just providing social services in the market economy on behalf of the state.

What are the implications of treating those with whom we work as citizens, individuals within a community, with rights and responsibilities.

For a start it means not only doing what we can to help overcome the barriers to full participation in society, but also discovering the reasons those barriers are there in the first place, and striving to remove those.

Very rarely does the problem lie entirely with the individual themselves. The social and economic system into which we are born has an enormous influence on our capacity to shape our own lives. An too unequal distribution of income greatly limits the opportunities available to the poorer members of our community. This is why distributive justice is important: every member of the community is entitled to a certain level of resources in the form of income and access to services that enables them to live in dignity and contribute to the life of the community (Cappo & Cass, 1994). When, in the course of our work assisting people overcome social and economic barriers to participation, we find that the reason for the existence of this barrier is an unjust distribution of society's resources, we have a moral duty to voice our objections to this state of affairs. The social service organisations of the Church, then, must be prepared to take on the role of political advocacy, and to do the necessary research to support such advocacy. Not every organisation will have the resources to do this, but at the very least they ought to be offering support to peak bodies and others organisations who can carry out this advocacy function.

While social and economic systems have an enormous impact on our capacity to fulfil our responsibilities to ourselves, our families, and our community, these systems and structures do not totally deprive us of an ability to shape our own destiny to some extent. Social conditions affect us, they do not determine us. So in analysing the reasons why people face barriers to social participation, it is equally degrading of human dignity to conclude that the problem is to be found wholly in 'society' or 'the economy' or 'the government', although our compassion may make the temptation to do this very strong.

The point here is not to support the ideology of 'blaming the victim', but to highlight what happens if we count out the possibility that the person with whom we are working has no capacity to improve their situation. What happens then is that the social service organisation can arrogate to itself the role of saviour, and the community sector can easily come to believe that it is the only sector of society that has any capacity to act morally at all, attacking entrenched inequities and rescuing the unfortunate 'marginalised' from their oppression. This is not how Catholic social service agencies ought to see themselves. While our agencies are in many ways the expression of important social values such as compassion and justice, we ought not allow this to become a cloak of pious virtue that protects us from criticism when we do not actually perform well. We should be judged by our performance more than by our rhetoric. To do otherwise is to open ourselves to the charge of hypocrisy.

Our self-perception must be, paradoxically, both humbler and more grand.

It must be humbler in the sense that we must put aside all vestiges of the paternalism that says 'we know what's best for you'. If we are aiming at genuinely empowering those who come to us for assistance to participate more actively in society, we should start by allowing them to exercise greater control, to the extent that they are able, over the kind of service they receive from our agencies. This may be difficult for many organisations that are used to delivering a standard type of service, and for their constituents as well, especially if they have been used to being passive recipients. This may sound like the rhetoric of the market model, but it differs substantially in that the relationship is not simply a transaction between a consumer and a provider, but is a genuine partnership of solidarity for mutual empowerment and participation.

The mutuality of the empowerment is important to stress, for it is not only the 'disadvantaged' 'consumer' that benefits. All those who contribute in some way to the provision of a service benefit, and there are multiplier effects for the whole community.

This is why the social service agencies of the Church can also have a 'more grand' self-understanding. For they fulfil an extremely important social function beyond the immediately obvious ones of providing social services and advocating for policy change at government level. Such organisations, along with other voluntary civic associations such as unions, professional groups, sporting clubs and service clubs, occupy a place in our social structure and system between the market, which views all people as self-interested individuals, and the state, which tends to arrogate to itself increasing responsibilities which might be better fulfilled by smaller groups. As such these intermediate civic associations offer a placed in which moral obligations can be cultivated, a way in which citizens can do things for themselves, and a shield against the atomising effects of the market and the totalising effects of central government.(Carroll, 1995)

In other words, within our social service agencies, all those involved - benefactors, workers (both professional and volunteer), board members and constituents (those who use the services) - should interact according to their various roles and abilities in a way that builds up solidarity amongst them and a sense of mutual responsibility.

If that is the case, then our agencies become sites of social citizenship, not just social service supermarkets or paternalistic hand-out agencies. Instead of people being categorised as 'consumers' and 'providers' or 'givers' and 'receivers', those involved in our agencies see one another as fellow- citizens. Our language, our structures, out policies and practices should all reflect this ultimate vision and goal.

If our organisations can move towards this ideal, however falteringly, then they will be contributing to the creation of a community in which the human dignity of individuals is respected and enhanced by participation in shared enterprises directed towards the common good. Such a society would be both more compassionate and more just, in which we are all really responsible for all.

Part Three: Faith and Politics in A Pluralist Society

In the citizenship model of welfare, advocacy plays a key role. The Church's experience in the area of social service adds weight to its mandate to participate in debates about public and social policy. It is the experience of Church members working in these areas, and their considered reflection upon that experience in the light of Gospel values, that allow the Church to advocate, where appropriate, specific changes that will align public and social policy more with the principles espoused by the Church.

But in exercising that role, Church representatitives and Church agencies are often accused of entering into the realm of politics which, it is often said, is not the legitimate role of the Church. A related accusation is that when it does seek to do so, it is attempting to 'impose' its values on the rest of the community, which runs counter to the spirit of liberal democracy. This section addresses both these attempts to limit the role of the Church in society. Further, it argues that articulating the values of the Gospel in the public forum is an integral part and indispensable dimension of the practice of true charity, of justice and of the citizenship model of providing social services.

What word would most accurately describe the Australian nation? The answer to that question, which encapsulates our sense of national identity, has varied from one period of our history to the next. Once we were considered a country of criminals, then perhaps we saw ourselves variously as pioneers, 'diggers', 'mates' or 'bronzed Aussies'. The power of the images associated with these words is demonstrated by their inclusion in many successful advertising campaigns. The problem with all of these attempts to summarise the spirit and character of Australia is that they are never complete. Someone or some group is always written out of the picture. Often this exclusion is deliberate, as has been and continues to be case in regard to women, our indigenous peoples and our migrants.

In modern Australia, however, we are much more aware of our diversity. Perhaps that is the best word we can find: diverse. Australia today is a nation comprising people from many ethnic backgrounds, speaking a multitude of languages, practising a variety of religions and living a range of lifestyles that give expression to a plethora of personal values and convictions.

Many people are concerned about this diversity, fearing that we are being splintered into 'a cluster of tribes', with values and origins and aims that are so different that there can be no hope of ever achieving a common sense of vision and purpose, and no hope of any sense of working together to produce common wealth for the common good. (Blainey, 1991)

But does diversity necessarily lead to division? Certainly the example of many other nations would appear to confirm the pessimistic view that difference leads inevitably to conflict. However, harmonious co-existence with groups whose values, origins and aims are very different from one's own is more likely in societies whose public institutions promote tolerance. Such societies place a high value on individual freedom and individual rights. Their form of government is usually democratic, giving rightful influence to the majority, but in liberal societies the rights of minorities and individuals are protected against the will of the majority by various checks and balances on the power of the state.

The increasing diversity of Australia's community is fostered by the communications revolution, which enables ideas and values and information to cross national borders with impunity. In this context, there is increasing debate about the role of governments in liberal societies such as ours. Should the state limit its aims and activities to establishing a legal and economic system which enhances individual freedom and allows groups within society to pursue their own aims and desires, as long as they do not infringe the rights of others? Or should the state aim to promote certain values, to encourage certain activities and attitudes and discourage others by exercising various forms of censorship? Many people rightly perceive a danger in this latter option, whereby the state, representing the views of the majority, may impose a certain moral code or moral order on citizens, thus curtailing their legitimate rights and freedoms.

But it is not as simple as that. In a liberal democratic society, in which a multitude of diverse groups each claiming rights to pursue their own ends and express their own ideals, there are inevitably situations in which rights conflict. The problem then becomes one of how to adjudicate between these conflicting rights. Which group, which right, is to be given priority?

For this, society needs a well identified and articulated set of values, moral principles, which allows us to set priorities and overall social goals, against which disputes of this kind can be tested and a decision made.

How is such a set of moral principles derived? It cannot simply be a case of 'might is right', whereby the rights of the majority always hold away over the rights of the minority and individuals. But neither can it be a case of 'might is wrong', whereby the objections of a single individual is always sufficient to prevent the progress of some event that everyone else in the community desires. A set of moral principles which can be used to guide governments, the judiciary and public authorities in resolving disputes in a liberal society must be derived from more than a show of hands. This is not to say that a show of hands is unimportant. After all, that is a key element in democratic governments. However the determination of our social values must also involve discerning the quality of the ideas and values that contribute to this guiding set of commonly held moral principles.

What is the test of quality when it comes to the ideas and values that compete in the public sphere for influence in our culture and our society? One such test is this: will the adoption of this value or idea in public policy deliver direct benefits to the group who is promoting the value or idea? If so, the quality of that value or idea is suspect.

There are many groups in society that seek to influence government decisions and change public attitudes, but not all of them do so out of concern for the whole community. Many lobby groups exist for the purpose of promoting the goals and ideas of their own members or constituents, with little or no regard for how that might impact on others. Very often such groups are skilled at promoting their own agenda under the guise of overall public benefit. This is not to say that all those ideas, values and policies which will benefit the promoters of such views will not benefit wider society as well. Nor is it to suggest that those who contribute to public debate in this way are selfishly motivated. What it does suggest, however, is that there is a significant and important role in public debate for those organisations whose sole motivation is the good of the whole community, and especially for those organisations who are prepared to advocate on behalf of those whose power and influence in the public sphere is diminished because of the place they occupy in our social structure....[T]he Church must be steadfast as the custodian of human rights. This is especially the case when the Church speaks on behalf of those who are disadvantagee, distressed and consequently devalued by the very systems that puport to be bringing about comunity wellbeing.(Usher, 1993, p.180)

For this reason, it is imperative that the Church be an active participant in the public conversation and dialogue that shapes society's basic moral principles, the principles which allow us to balance the various conflicting rights and freedoms that a liberal society promotes.

It is essential that people of faith, who strive to live according to the law of love and the example of self-sacrifice given to them by Christ, not leave their principles in the private sphere, but take them into the public sphere, the agora, the meeting place of ideas and values that will ultimately influence the nature of our society.

We ought not apologise for doing this. It used to be a saying that one ought never discuss politics or religion at dinner parties, because it was bound to cause disharmony. That might be appropriate for dinner parties, but it is not appropriate when it comes to public policy and culture. The modern version of the old advice on dinner party etiquette is the argument that in a liberal society, we try, so far as we can, neither to assert nor to deny any religious, philosophical or moral views, or their associated philosophical accounts of truth and the status of values. (Rawls, 1987)

John Rawls, one of the most influential political philosophers of our time, argues that the best way to handle the diversity of values in a pluralist democracy is to practice this 'method of avoidance': governments should avoid making policy based on any particular set of moral values. It should attempt to be 'value-free' and to create an environment in which personal liberty can be maximised. The problem with this idyllic view is that provides no framework for the resolution of disputes when one group's freedom seems to clash and limit those of another group. Thus lobby groups form to pressure governments into taking their side. The result is that groups with different views about society, instead of attempting to seek common ground in some compromise, avoid dialogue with one another and seek to outflank, dominate, or discredit one another in the struggle for public influence. The political process can thus become reduced to a battle between powerful lobby groups, in which financial resources become a key factor. Ordinary citizens, watching the debates from the periphery, easily become disillusioned, alienated and cynical about playing their role in contributing to public debate and shaping the nation's culture.

Instead of avoidance, the Church seeks engagement with those many and diverse groups who have differing views and values. The Church calls on all people of good will, regardless of their religious beliefs, to be actively engaged with the ideas , principles and values which the Church expounds through its social teachings. However, in calling for engagement, the Church also has obligations not just to speak, but to listen. The Church must first be a learning church before it can effectively and credibly be a teaching church. It must be open to the views of others, seeking common ground, and accepting of the fact that truth has many guises. In participating in such a process of engagement, the Church is aware that the end result is likely to be a set of guiding moral principles, forged in the public forum, with which it does not entirely agree, and which is also in constant flux.

Nevertheless, the process of engagement, of diverse groups actively contributing to public conversation in a spirit of open-mindedness and generosity, seeking to establish some common ground and common vision, is just as important, perhaps more important in the long term, than the actual set of values that is arrived at as a result of this process. Such a process encourages participation, inclusiveness, mutuality and reciprocity, all values that make for a truly civil society. In seeking engagement and dialogue, the Church adopts a means to social change that is consistent with its ends, namely furthering the common good while respecting the difference and dignity of individuals and minorities.

So the Church's primary purpose in entering public forums on political and secular issues is to ensure that public policy and public institutions are consistent with certain fundamental and universal moral principles.

The secular institution that primarily serves the function of articulating universal principles to the global community in an effort to guide political action is the United Nations. UN conferences, with the Church as an active participant and contributor, have produced various universal declarations of human rights, as well as more specific charters (e.g., on the rights of the child) and then plans for action that are supposed to supply the practical policy direction for national governments. All these declarations, charters, and plans for action are the result of engagement, debate, discussion and consensus within the global community through the UN member nations. They represent an attempt to articulate a set of common principles which ought to guide policy and law-makers in individual countries. However, often it is the crucial link between universal principles and their practical application in a particular nation that is weak. The Church has commented on this weakness:

The Church therefore has a special responsibility, as contributor to the formulation of these declarations, to monitor the way such international charters are interpreted and implemented in each country or UN member state. The Church is in a unique position to be able to fulfil this role, because unlike the other nations who have contributed to these documents, the Church does not have to be concerned as to whether speaking up in defence of these rights will affect trade relations or damage foreign affairs. Its responsibility lies not in defending itself and protecting its own interests, but in defending the rights of those whose human rights are being denied. In many countries, the Church has been the only institution standing in the way of outright oppression of human rights and social injustice.

For the same purpose, that is the promotion of the dignity of the individual, the Church, through public conversation and advocacy, legitimately seeks to extend the coverage of universal human rights beyond that which has been articulated by the UN. For example, the right of unborn human beings to life itself is not included in any UN charter, but still it remains as a fundamental right, and one takes precedence over many others due to the fact that without life, other rights are irrelevant.

Thus the Church seeks to contribute to the public sphere the idea that the exercise of freedom, unregulated by moral principles, can lead to the demeaning of one's own human dignity as well as that of others. The Church not only has a right to contribute to debate on contentious political issues from its moral viewpoint, it has a duty to do so.

This is not to claim for the Church hierarchy the right to dictate to its lay members and others how they should vote in elections, or which side to take on a particular issue when the various contingencies allow Christians to differ legitimately over the detail of a specific policy direction. Without a commitment to engagement in shaping a common set of principles from a diverse range of views, the Church could rightly be accused of seeking to impose its own moral code on society. Rather than imposing its views on people, which it has no power to do in any case, the Church sees its role in the political sphere as:

educating the public about Catholic teaching and its implications for public policy; analysing the moral aspects of various social issues and policies; testing public policy, especially economic policy; against the moral principles articulated in the Gospel and Catholic social teaching; making public statements and entering public conversation in order to promote moral principles in policy and to influence public attitudes; voicing concern on human rights, social justice, and other moral issues.

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